The Illusion of Adequate Information

I was recently reflecting on past decisions—both minor and monumental. A decision can be as mundane as selecting an electronic component or as significant as launching a full-scale business and product development initiative. Either way, hidden assumptions eventually reveal themselves and bite you or your team in the back.

Sometimes the big decisions are easier to navigate, even when new evidence surfaces later. But often, a minor decision carries an oversized impact—like a component making it all the way through design, compliance, and manufacturing, only to go End-of-Life (EOL) six months later.

The things you didn’t know were unknowns weren’t failures of intelligence—we are all smart people in these rooms. They were failures of information completeness. The difference matters.

I started reflecting on this after reading a recent study: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11463766/

The study explores what the authors call ‘The Illusion of Information Adequacy.’ It’s closely linked to Andy Grove’s advice that ‘only the paranoid survive,’ or the corporate tradition of appointing a devil’s advocate. But ‘illusion’ is an apt term—it captures a deeply human flaw, much like Errare humanum est. Being human doesn’t make it any less costly when hidden assumptions bite a project.

That sympathetic view does not change the fact that this illusion can be time-consuming, costly, and outright harmful.

What the Research Shows

Researchers gave participants a scenario: deciding whether two schools should merge. One group received the full material, while a comparison group received roughly half the arguments.

Both groups rated their information as equally adequate, and both felt equally capable of making the call. In fact, the group with half the information was, on average, slightly more confident.

The uncomfortable part of this finding is that people don’t experience the gap. The person with half the picture doesn’t feel like they have half the picture. They feel like they have enough. The decision proceeds.

If the result is good, nobody scrutinizes the original reasoning. If it fails, corrective action becomes an expensive nuisance.

Maps are not suitable for navigation. Always use an up-to-date chart when sailing.

Making the Blank Spaces Visible

Organizations excel at this blind spot. A strategy gets executed, something goes wrong, a retrospective is logged into a document canvas—and there it stays. Almost nobody goes back to ask: Which assumptions did we miss when we made this call, and which of our explicit beliefs turned out to be wrong?

The study offers one encouraging finding: when participants were later shown the full set of arguments, most revised their view toward the middle. New information does move people—when it arrives in a legible form.

Information arriving as noise—a buried Slack message, an uncaptured meeting comment—doesn’t close the gap; it adds to it.

The practical question isn’t how to eliminate uncertainty, which is impossible. It’s how to make the assumptions behind a decision visible before the outcome rewrites everyone’s memory of what they thought at the time.

If this pattern sounds familiar in your own product or management decisions, we are building tools specifically designed to make these implicit assumptions visible early before they become costly surprises. If this sounds like a challenge your team faces, explore how we’re solving it and register for the Ainolabs beta program.

The Spectrum of Truth

Fact, Faith, and the Space Between

Companies, and people, like to think their beliefs update the moment new evidence arrives with a clean patch, applied and closed. In practice, belief revision is closer to correcting a course at sea than installing a software update. You don’t jump straight from “the chart is wrong” to “recalculate everything.” You nudge the heading, watch what happens, and only reluctantly admit the original bearing was off.

Errare humanum est, to err is human. The phrase leaves out the more interesting part: to err, to see the evidence directly, and still find a reading of events where the original belief was basically sound. That reframing is not a bug in human cognition. It’s the default behavior of any system, human or organizational, that has a stake in being right.

Belief sits on a spectrum. At one end is empirical fact — unyielding, indifferent to preference. A depth sounder reports a number regardless of how committed you are to today’s course. At the other end is something closer to faith — decisions made and ventures started with evidence that is, by any honest accounting, insufficient. Most operational life, and most enterprise decision-making, happens in the space between these two poles, and I’d argue that’s not a design flaw. It’s where robust action actually gets made.

A Fact is difficult to argue with. It is not necessarily a comfortable or easily palatable, but one can’t dispute it.

Empirical fact is necessary and generally unpleasant to accept and process. A quarterly number does not care about the narrative built around it. This is a useful fixed point everything else gets checked against but on its own it offers no guidance about what to do next. Fact tells you where you are. It doesn’t tell you where to steer.

Most day-to-day decisions run on heuristics, not derivations — pragmatic shortcuts that let an organization function without re-deriving first principles every morning. “Fast delivery wins deals” is a heuristic belief. So is “the second cheapest wine is fine.” These aren’t beliefs held with high confidence so much as operational defaults nobody has bothered to interrogate, because interrogating every default would be its own form of paralysis.

What happens when a fact and a belief collide?

This is the interesting failure mode. When solid evidence contradicts an operating assumption, the instinct is rarely to revise the assumption outright. More often there’s a quiet renegotiation of the terms — the conditions were unusual, the data’s noisy, the miss was really a deliberate trade-off. This is worth naming plainly, because it’s exactly the mechanism a belief-management discipline exists to interrupt: not to punish the original assumption, but to make its correction cheap enough that renegotiating reality stops being the easier option. Beliefs can turn into identity markers, faith.. That is one more notch on the continuum between “facts” and “faith”. In that case a belief stops being a claim about the world and starts being a stake in who someone is.
Correcting a forecast is trivial.
Correcting a belief that’s become entangled with a person’s judgment, role, or track record is not. That is  why belief systems that assign ownership without assigning blame matter. The goal isn’t to strip beliefs of their owners. It’s to make revising a belief cost the owner nothing more than the revision itself.
Correcting “faith” is just about meaningless as it is possibly harmful to a human and at the very least next to impossible. In religious terms, there are converts, but that is a rare breed. Faith is practically immutable, and when facts contradict faith – vae factis.

Faith, and the decision to leave the dock anyway

At the far edge, the evidence runs out and the decision gets made regardless. No venture, campaign, or product launch is backed by proof sufficient to remove all doubt — if it were, someone would have already done it, and there’d be no advantage left in doing it now. This isn’t irrational so much as structurally unavoidable: robust action, by definition, has to commit before the picture is complete.

None of this is an argument for eliminating the messier end of the spectrum in favor of the clean one. A company that only acted on certainty would rarely act at all.

The more useful question, for a person or an organization, isn’t where on this spectrum do you sit.
Instead, it is to know where you stand at right now, or are you fooling yourself that you practice pure logic and fact-based management.

Once you know that it is easier to consider possible changes and improvement in the true spririt of continous learning, retrospectives, after-action reviews and post mortems. You may end up managing your beliefs instead of being driven by assumptions.

Facts Are Hindsight. Roadmaps Are Beliefs.

Managers Are Gamblers and Accountants Are Historians

Robust action under uncertainty is recommendable. Yet, how are facts, beliefs, opinions, expectations and so forth similar and different and how to separate the essential from the unlikely to reach that set of Robust action alternatives and ultimately the plan and action?

When someone in a product or strategy meeting says, “I believe this feature will increase customer demand by 20%,” what are they actually doing?

Depending on who you ask, they are either issuing a data-driven prediction, placing a speculative bet, making an educated guess, or simply manifesting their hopes into the universe.

There is a wide collection of future-facing words. Inside an enterprise, these words mean wildly different things depending on which floor you sit on.

Product planning often includes suggestions like adding a new dashboard widget or other pet feature will increase customer demand by 20%.

The statement sounds precise, authoritative, and completely grounded in strategic foresight. In reality, it is likely to be a personal hunch into the quantitative dialect of executive decision-making.

Tech companies run on these future-facing claims and suggestions, yet rarely acknowledge what they actually are. Depending on who looks at the proposal, the exact same statement qualifies as a user-centric vision, a risky engineering distraction, or a binding revenue commitment. Words like belief, expectation, forecast, and bet get tossed around inter-changeably, blurring the line between empirical certainty and optimistic guesswork.

Before an organization can make sound decisions, it should clarify these words and concepts. Managing product development isn’t about scrubbing away unproven ideas to chase absolute certainty, but about recognizing that every roadmap is inherently built on assumptions.

Understanding how different teams make and process those assumptions is where robust action planning and effective leadership can begin.

The Enterprise Lexicon of Unproven Truths

Every corporate role translates the language of the future through its own functional lens. When a product manager speaks of a belief, they describe a deeply felt product vision anchored in user empathy and qualitative customer feedback. The engineering lead hears that same word as an unsourced hypothesis destined to force scope creep late on a Friday afternoon, while the sales director immediately converts it into next quarter’s baseline quota.

Expectations carry a similar dual meaning across the org chart. Company leadership issues an expectation as a polite euphemism for a non-negotiable directive, whereas middle management absorbs it as a rapidly ticking deadline. When finance builds a forecast, they assemble a complex statistical model across dozens of spreadsheet tabs, while the operational teams treat that exact forecast as corporate astrology wrapped in business casual.

Strategic bets reveal a fundamental divide in risk perception across executive tiers. A chief executive views a bet as a bold, visionary move that demonstrates market leadership to investors and the board. Conversely, a line manager sees that same bet as a high-stakes coin toss where heads guarantees business as usual and tails triggers an organizational restructuring.

Finally, the weight of an opinion depends entirely on who voices it in the room. When the highest-paid person in the conference room states an opinion, the surrounding team often accepts it as settled science. When anyone else offers an opinion without supporting data, colleagues instantly flag it as a risky political stance.

Managing Beliefs Instead of Pretending They Are Facts

Successful product leadership requires managing uncertainty rather than disguising it behind corporate jargon. When teams frame a future feature as a guaranteed fact, they construct rigid development roadmaps around pure illusion. Product managers achieve far better outcomes when they treat every forward-looking statement as an explicit hypothesis.

First, teams must explicitly calculate the financial and operational cost of being wrong before committing resources to a feature. Second, product organizations must design the smallest possible experiment that can validate or invalidate the core assumption in market conditions. Finally, leadership needs to define the exact metrics that will force the team to abandon a failing bet before sunk costs accumulate.

Effective management never eliminates beliefs in favor of rigid historical data. Strong leaders practice deliberate belief management by converting vague optimism into testable bets, using current discovery cycles to manufacture future facts.

Why Fact-Based Management Won’t Save Your Product

Modern product organizations elevate fact-based management to absolute gospel. Executives urge teams to move fast, rely exclusively on telemetry, and purge human intuition from decision-making. While fact-based decision-making sounds disciplined and risk-averse, it masks a fundamental reality: facts exist exclusively in the past.

A fact represents an event that has already occurred and can be and was measured.  Analytics platforms log facts, engineers measure them, and finance teams audit them.

Facts deliver total reliability and zero variance, yet they remain entirely incapable of dictating what a team should build tomorrow. Operating strictly on fact-based management does not produce foresight; it delivers perfect 20/20 hindsight wrapped in a dashboard.

Facts serve as historical bookkeeping entries for accountants, historians, and post-mortem reviews. Conversely, beliefs, expectations, and strategic bets form the core material of future product development. Beliefs can include topics that are hard or impossible to measure – yet.

Product managers operate squarely in that unwritten future, making the deliberate management of unproven beliefs their primary responsibility. Facts are necessary, but they do point to the past – like horseless carriage versus automobile.

Ultimately, navigating the unknown isn’t about eliminating speculation—it’s about managing it with rigor. While historical data tells us where we’ve been, growth requires taking calculated leaps into what comes next. Ainolabs provides tools to help people and organizations structure, track, and evaluate decisions under uncertainty.

Ground future bets in systematic evidence and continuously refine assumptions based on past learning, and you can transform fluffy guesses into a continuous engine for intelligent strategic planning, robust action and execution.

This post was written and drawn with the help of generative AI tools.

Doubt, jagged intelligence and Robust Action

Companies – probably anyone – would like to make informed, robust decisions in the face of uncertainty that result in reasonable outcomes in all or most plausible future scenarios. In other words strategic, flexible measures that accomplish immediate goals while deliberately preserving long-term options.

Jagged intelligence refers to the uneven performance of AI models. They excel in some tasks, but may hinder human effectiveness in others. I saw the phrase in an New York Times article, and read the background study mentioned there.

Human consciousness has been tied with thinking ever since and possibly before the utterance Cogito, ergo sum. With AI systems, some psychologists have paid closer attention to the actual thought process and suggest that the process is at least as important as the outcome of thought. Doubt, mistakes, learning from experience are essential and so the adage should be I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.

Jagged intelligence and doubt and thought processes that can be explained are necessary for robust decisions. Decisions that are made while taking into account the limitations of the thought processes will end up more robust when future events fold in unexpected ways.

Ainolabs Belief Management, or Cognitive Fitness tools are built to help collect, capture, articulate and handle doubt and to illuminate peaks and valleys of jagged intelligence. Perhaps they can reveal the occasional black swan waiting in the darkness.

Belief management for people

The previous posts have been about architecture, system design, complexity, computational cost, and other technical and intrinsic matters about building autonomous systems.

This installment focuses on the people, and what beliefs, assumptions, expectations could mean to enterprise employees. Their work, incentives, business success, and company performance under uncertainty is discussed.

The result is an approximate guideline and system design for building Ainolabs Cognitive Fitness tool. The internals is expressed “Belief management”; that probably will be replaced with something less theoretical, e.g “Cognitive Fitness” or “Decision Intelligence” . These should connect to user outcomes instead of epistemology.

Please let me know if this piece or any other is complete non-sense. If it is not – enjoy!

World Model is a set of Beliefs

Beliefs, assumptions, scenarios expectations, and other similar expressions refer to possible futures events with some scope, time, likelihood, and potential outcomes and results.

A company’s World Model should be populated with such information. We call those beliefs, and propose that they are entered in a Belief Manager. This potential system component is outlined in the attached next entry of the Ainolabs architectural components.

World Models in Enterprise Automation

The previous post about autonomous systems discussed World Models in a narrow domain. My goal is to outline, understand and eventually build automated workflows in enterprise environments. The following discussion about Enterprise World Models, Belief Management and Robust Actions v.s. perfect foresight is the next conceptual step

Thinking about World Models

I have spent time in figuring out how the general CMLS architecture would apply to workflows in an enterprise. To get to an understanding I ended doing intellectual – or at least mental – circles and spirals, and needed to start from basics. So here are a few pages of a students journey through enterprise and a bit of technical architecture and design views about how to design an autonomously driving vehicle or how to automate an enterprise workflow.

The text is in an attachment. I don’t like the constraints and defaults of WordPress for slightly more serious work.

Smart system cost

We will create a somewhat concrete, yet still hypothetical example.

We’ll illustrate the total cost over a year (365 days) of operation for the following scenario:

The system is a free-roaming four legged front-loader robot.
It has two arms to handle parcels and packages. The arms have sensors for weight and surface characteristics – “gentle touch” not to crush materials or human operators.

The robot operates inside a facility, warehouse or factory. It has a visual, lidar and radar system for observing and navigating the environment. That is subsystem number 1, “Navigation”.

The front-loader has a system to handle propulsion, the four legs. That is subsystem 2, “propulsion”.

The front-loader has a system to handle the materials in the warehouse with the two arms. This is subsystem 3, “payload processing”.

The front-loader has a separate visual, audio and textual UI system for interacting with human workers in the facility or elsewhere (remote connection). The front loader’s UX is friendly and based on state of the art Human Computer Interface practices. This is subsystem 4, human interaction.

The front loader is re-trained every 24 hours, i.e. 365 times per year. The initial training material for subsystems 1-4 is almost completely disjoint. Each separate training material has a high signal to noise ratio. The system is expected to handle 20 human interactions and 10 parcel operations per hour.

With these characteristics, we will compare between all ML eggs in one model v.s. four disjoint models.

Architecture alternatives

A. Monolithic model
  • One large multimodal model handling all subsystems jointly.
  • Shared latent space across navigation, control, manipulation, and HCI.
  • Retrained end-to-end every 24 hours.
B. Multimodel system
  • Four specialist models:
    • M1M_1​: Navigation
    • M2M_2: Propulsion
    • M3M_3​: Payload processing
    • M4M_4: Human interaction
  • Lightweight integration layer:
    • Task router
    • Shared state abstraction
  • Each subsystem retrained independently every 24 hours.

Because training data is almost completely disjoint and each subset has a high signal to noise -ratio, this is a best-case scenario for modularization

Parameter and scaling assumptions

These are deliberately conservative and internally consistent.

Model sizes

Let:

  • Monolithic model size: Pmono=1010  parametersP_{\text{mono}} = 10^{10} \;\text{parameters}
  • Each specialist (thanks to disjoint, high-SR data): Pi=1.5×109P_i = 1.5\times10^9

Total specialist parameters:∑Pi=6×109\sum P_i = 6\times10^9

Modular storage is smaller, not larger. That is realistic in this case since domains barely overlap.


Training cost scaling

We’ll assume that training cost is proportional to the number of parameters P in a model. Ctrain∝T⋅PC_{\text{train}} \propto T \cdot P

Let one full training of the monolith cost:Ctrain,mono=1.0  cost unitC_{\text{train,mono}} = 1.0 \;\text{cost unit}

Then per full retraining:Ctrain,multi=0.15  per subsystem⇒0.6  total per dayC_{\text{train,multi}} = 0.15 \;\text{per subsystem} \Rightarrow 0.6 \;\text{total per day}

This reflects:

  • smaller models,
  • higher SR,
  • no cross-domain entanglement.

Inference activity volume and cost

Per robot:

  • Human interactions:
    20×24×365=175,20020 \times 24 \times 365 = 175{,}20020×24×365=175,200 / year
  • Parcel ops:
    10×24×365=87,60010 \times 24 \times 365 = 87{,}60010×24×365=87,600 / year

Assume each event requires:

  • Monolith: full model inference
  • Modular: 1–2 specialists activated, average = 1.5

Assume inference cost ∝ active parameters.

  • Monolith inference cost per event: Cinf,mono∝1010C_{\text{inf,mono}} \propto 10^{10}
  • Modular inference cost per event: Cinf,multi∝1.5×1.5×109=2.25×109C_{\text{inf,multi}} \propto 1.5 \times 1.5\times10^9 = 2.25\times10^9

That is ~4.4× cheaper per interaction for the Smart system based on multiple integrated models, or Docker for AI.

Almost there: Five-year Total Cost

Training cost (5 years)

ArchitectureDaily costDays5-year total
Monolithic1.018251825
Multimodel0.618251095

Training savings: ~40%


Inference cost (5 years)

Total interactions per year:175,200+87,600=262,800175{,}200 + 87{,}600 = 262{,}800175,200+87,600=262,800

Five years:1.314×106  events1.314 \times 10^6 \;\text{events}1.314×106events

ArchitectureCost per event5-year total
Monolithic1.01,314,000
Multimodel0.225295,650

Inference savings: ~4.4×


Storage & integration (5 years)
ComponentMonolithicMultimodel
Model storageHigh (10B params)Moderate (6B params)
Integration infraMinimalModerate
Net effectBaseline+5–10% overhead

We will conservatively add 100 cost units to multimodel TCO.

Final TCO comparison (5 years)

Cost componentMonolithicMultimodel
Training1,8251,095
Inference1,314,000295,650
Storage + integration~0+100
Total TCO~1,315,825~296,845

And conclusions:

So what did we do and say here?

We outlined a theoretical, yet plausible system, and compare two alternative ways to build that. The architectures we compared are a single large model that handles everything (monolith), and a system built of components, i.e small independent ML models that are integrated (multimodel architecture).

The multimodel architecture is ~4.4× cheaper over 5 years, dominated by inference cost savings.

Why modular wins decisively here

  1. Disjoint, high-signal domains
    No representational duplication penalty.
  2. Daily retraining
    Training efficiency compounds strongly over time.
  3. Sparse activation at inference
    Only the relevant subsystem runs per task.
  4. Embodied system
    Most tasks are local (navigate, lift, talk), not global reasoning.

This is almost the ideal use case for modular intelligence.

In this scenario, a monolith is paying a tax for generality it does not use most of the time.

Development cost of an AI system

Ainolabs talks about systems, entities that are operated for defined purposes and with expectations of generating value to their developers, owners, users and other stakeholders. Value depends on the business case. The cost can be estimated, and we’ll get to this formulaic expression below:

Systems are developed, launched, updated, supported and eventually replaced or discarded. They have a life span, and with life span there is the life time cost. We try to estimate that on a somewhat abstract level of complexity, as discussed in Computer Science.

There are two ways to build an AI system. One is the current, train everything in a single model, possibly create agent instances in that, package the model and release and run.

It is also possible to build a system of interconnected smaller models, minimodels. That is cost effective when the system functionality splits into disjoint subdomains, and especially if the combined dataset would have very low entropy, or, put in signal processing terms, signal to noise ratio (SR) is very low in the aggregate data set, but high in the parts when compartmentalized.

Building a system with many models incurs general overhead. In the Ainolabs architecture that means the burden of Content Classifier. This adds to the processing of each input, and should be balanced by the reduced cost of processing in the separate models (Learning Processes).

Scientish-like complexity estimates of development

By AI system we mean a system that uses Machine Learning technology as an essential element. A system could be built, as mentioned above as a monolith, or as a collection of separate smaller models. The development of an ML (AI) system is mostly related to training, and so the following estimates the order of magnitude costs of that.

We’ll use the following terms:

  • T = number of training examples
  • d = feature dimension per example
  • P = number of model parameters (often ≈ scale of the model)
  • E = training epochs / outer iterations (or rounds/trees, etc.)
  • k = clusters or neighbors (when relevant)
  • F = per-example forward+backward FLOPs (architecture-dependent; ≈ proportional
    to P for dense nets)

In machine learning, P represents the total number of trainable parameters — the variables
that the training process adjusts to minimize loss.

Taking noise into account

The number of parameters in the model, P, depends on the quality of the data. This has an impact on the model, training and semantic model capacity. Data with a lot of noise and no signal results in a very easy model, but with no practical value – just consider the ultimate white noise, cosmic background 4K radiation. P is conceptually a measure of information in a model.

If the training data as an aggregate is noisy – e.g. different sensory systems for different purposes look like noise when combined – splitting it might help.

Next we try to create a way to express and predict P in terms of dataset characteristics like size T , signal-to-noise ratio (SR), and desired accuracy A.

For that we need to define

For a model the number of parameters P needed is roughly proportional to the amount of true signal in your data and inversely proportional to the noise and desired accuracy.

We’ll skip a few steps and claim that the number of parameters is proportional (“Oh”-notation) to the size of the corpus T, signal to noise ration SR, and desired accuracy A. Exponents depend on the specific situation:

And with that it is possible to express the order of magnitude of training a model as

Divide et impera, or split the system into parts

The full dataset T might be large, could consist of orthogonally different data (audio, video, and temperature, for example). In such a case it would make sense to split the task – LP1, LP2 etc in the architecture.

Next total dataset has size T, and it is divided it into disjoint subsets:

Training cost for comparison between a monolith and multimodel system are

With these two it is possible compare the effectiveness of different or combined data sets for an operational system that utilizes Machine Learning technology – an AI system.